## \*\*Specific Aff Updates\*\*

### Space Assets 2AC AT: Debris Defense

#### Probability of collision is cascading every second.

Bohumil Doboš and Jakub Praˇz ́ak 21. Faculty of Social Studies, Institute of Political Studies, Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic. Institute of Political Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University. “Master spoiler: a strategic value of Kessler Syndrome.” Taylor and Francis Online. Apr 27 2021. https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/14702436.2021.1997095

However, the satellite numbers are expected to multiply rapidly, and it was estimated there might be no less than 107,000 active satellites by 2029 (Samson 2020). Apart from functional systems, orbits are congested by a significant amount of space debris. As of January 2021, the U.S. Space Surveillance Network tracked over 28,000 objects in the orbits; nevertheless, it is estimated that there are already about 900,000 objects larger than 1 cm orbiting the Earth, from which only about 34,000 are larger than 10 cm (ESA 2021). The number of 10 cm is vital because, generally, satellites are protected against a collision with objects smaller than 0,1 cm and objects larger than 10 cm can be possibly avoided (EU Community Research and Development Information Service 2012).

Until 2021, there were more than 560 break-ups, explosions, collisions or other fragmenting events in the orbits registered (ESA 2021), with the most notorious events of the Chinese ASAT test in 2007 and the Iridium-Cosmos collision in 2009. A single intentional Chinese kinetic ASAT test in 2007 resulted in the creation of more than 3 000 pieces of debris larger than 10 cm (Nicholls 2021) and accidental collision between Iridium and Cosmos in 2009 produced almost 2 000 pieces of debris larger than 10 cm (Secure World Foundation 2010). However, the in-orbit collisions predicted by the socalled Kessler Syndrome – a situation when the naturally occurring collisions intensify to a point when they lead to a cascading effect damaging an increasing number of systems – will increasingly occur as the number of space systems rises and may result in a cascading effect that eventually can limit or preclude access to outer space. Kessler and Cour-Palais (1978, 2637) stated that “[a]s the number of artificial satellites in earth orbit increases, the probability of collisions between satellites also increases. Satellite collisions would produce orbiting fragments, each of which would increase the probability of further collisions, leading to the growth of a belt of debris around the Earth. Hence, in the case of a severe debris-resulting incident, outer space may become impenetrable. Though the in-orbit collisions are currently rare, they are gradually and steadily becoming increasingly likely, and long-term space debris accumulating effect already requires mitigating countermeasures to keep outer space accessible for the future (Drmola and Hubik 2018). Moreover, as the Indian kinetic ASAT test in March 2019 demonstrated, the states apparently did not completely abandon additional debris-proliferating activities (Weeden and Samson 2021, 5–3, 5–4).

### Space Assets 2AC AT: ESA CP

#### The ESA fails.

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However, there are gaps in European STM capacities. Limited sensor coverage (owing to limited funding and relatively low prioritization in terms of national spending) has led to over-reliance on the US SSN for comprehensive STM. Similarly, limited national space intelligence capabilities are largely reliant on US-provided space intelligence. Another primary EU vulnerability is its lack of experience. The UK has not capitalized on its experience and although there is expertise in the analysts at Fylingdales they are, according to some experts,25 not effectively utilized, and just one sensor in the UK will not provide full STM coverage.

In addition, European sensors are not as capable as those in the US – they have lower resolution and therefore can only track large objects. To become more complementary and to contribute globally, Europe requires new and dedicated sensors capable of tracking smaller objects. One individual with experience both in the military and commercial aspects of STM expressed amazement that the community talks about the significance of STM but provides little funding for dedicated sensors. The current EU funding for future STM support systems was described as ‘pitiful’ by one expert.26 For Europe to significantly contribute to STM, at union and member state levels, requires additional funding to develop better capabilities.

### Space Assets 2AC AT: EU CP – Perm

#### Aligning NATO policy to support EU multilateralism solves better.

Schake 17 [Kori, Distinguished Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Deputy Director-General of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Lecturer in the Public Policy Program at Stanford University, PhD in Government from the University of Maryland, “NATO Without America?”, The American Interest, 5/25/2017, https://www.the-american-interest.com/2017/05/25/nato-without-america/]

But most European governments conduct their national security policies at a much greater distance from their militaries, celebrating their concentration on “soft power” tools in lieu of force. Not only do they privilege those tools, they often consider their policies, and themselves, morally superior for the choice. One need only listen to EU Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker or read of the European Parliament passing legislation condemning U.S. intelligence agencies to share President Trump’s aggravation with Europe. We sentimentalize the Transatlantic connection at our peril.

However, NATO’s fundamental bargain continues to be overwhelmingly advantageous to the United States. European states would be both less willing and less able to help us without NATO. European allies would likely spend even less—not more—on defense without the constant hectoring of the United States within NATO. They would likely spend more on military pay and benefits than on high-end weapons and capabilities; all Western militaries must contend with competing demands on their funding, but the problem is more effectively addressed in NATO, where militaries have greater political capital to make hard choices than in solely national or EU forums. They would not be nearly as able to get organized and act decisively for a common purpose when needed. And they would be less likely to feel an obligation to participate in wars that the U.S. military fights beyond Europe. Diplomatically, we would need to negotiate European states into participating in our endeavors rather than expecting them to proffer a good excuse to remain out. That may seem a subtle difference, but it isn’t.

#### Only building EU defense within NATO allows it to be financially feasible and synergistic with the U.S.

Stanley R. Sloan 17, Visiting Scholar in Political Science at Middlebury College and Author of Defense of the West: NATO, the European Union and the Transatlantic Bargain, “Washington Might Feel The Chill Of A More United European Defense”, War on the Rocks, 6/22/2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/06/washington-might-feel-the-chill-of-a-more-united-european-defense/

The answer given by most European and American defense experts is that the European allies do need to do more. But most also agree that those efforts will be most effective if shaped by and built within the framework of the transatlantic alliance and its leading institution, NATO.

A somewhat different argument appeared in these pages recently, observing that President Trump had not yet reduced its commitment to Europe as many have feared, but have nonetheless managed to alienate our allies. Despite the downside, the authors, Benjamin Friedman and Joshua Shifrinson, argue that Trump’s policies could lead to an increase in European defense efforts. Whether the increases currently underway are in any way stimulated by Trump’s “tough talk” remains to be seen. The allies agreed in the 2014 Wales Pledge to increase defense spending to reach the goal of 2 percent of GDP by 2024. The pledge came explicitly in response to Russian aggression against Ukraine and threatening behavior toward NATO allies.

Jordan Becker, an expert on NATO burden-sharing, recently observed in War on the Rocks that “…the true effect of the Wales Pledge will not be measurable for several years, and it will be difficult to isolate its effects from the effect of tough talk on burden-sharing from Washington.” From a historical perspective, there is no solid evidence that “tough talk” from Washington has been particularly helpful in stimulating European efforts, starting with the fact that the failure of the European Defense Community in 1954 came in the wake of U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles warning that such an event could result in an “agonizing reappraisal” of the American commitment to European security. That, of course, did not come about because Washington’s perception of the Soviet threat far outweighed the disappointment at the European failure.

The center of current efforts to improve coordination of European defense efforts is found in a report by the European Union’s executive body, the European Commission, and the union’s top foreign and defense policy official, Federica Mogherini. This report, “Reflection Paper on the Future of European Defence,” is a responsible, credible piece of advocacy for the European Union to develop greater coherence in the defense efforts of its members.

The report reasonably acknowledges that decisions along the way would be made by the member states, with the E.U. institutions providing support. The report calls for developing a common defense industrial market while enhancing E.U. military planning and operational capabilities.

The report lays out three scenarios, or options, moving from a relatively modest set of goals to more ambitious ones. In the first scenario, E.U. members would intensify cooperation, but would operate largely on a volunteer basis:

Such cooperation would … depend on ad-hoc decisions as and when a new threat or crisis emerges … Member States would not be bound — politically or legally — by a common direction of travel in security and defence.

In the second scenario,

the E.U. would enhance its ability to project military power and to engage fully in external crisis management and in building partners’ security and defence capacities. It would also improve its ability to protect Europe in areas … such as counterterrorism, countering of hybrid and cyber threats, border control and maritime and energy security.

The European Union, in this case, would be far more institutionally involved in defense and would be “more directly engaged in the protection of Member States and citizens in case of significant attacks or disruptions against a country and/or its critical infrastructures.”

In the most integrative and ambitious of three scenarios laid out in the report, the defense union would be sufficiently evolved by 2025 so that most defense and security decisions would be taken in common and executed at the E.U. level. According to the report,

The E.U. would be able to run high-end operations to better protect Europe, potentially including operations against terrorist groups, naval operations in hostile environments or cyber-defence actions.

The report sees this option as a complement to NATO, not competition: “…the protection of Europe would become a mutually reinforcing responsibility of the E.U. and NATO.”

This most demanding outcome could be seen as exactly what the United States wanted when Dulles threatened the “agonizing reappraisal” of its commitment. However, the Eisenhower administration had not fully comprehended the many factors, as I have discussed elsewhere, that would eventually lead to the failure of the European Defense Community. Today, it is perhaps some Europeans (and Americans, including at one time the Obama administration) who are being too optimistic about the willingness of European states to merge their sovereignties so thoroughly.

European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker has in the past emphasized the importance of the non-military contributions the European Union makes to security. But in endorsing this report, and apparently provoked by Trump’s critique, he argued “…soft power alone is not powerful enough in an increasingly militarized world,” as he has also suggested in his past arguments for creating a “European army.”

In the report, Mogherini and Juncker all have emphasized that this E.U. defense enhancement should happen in overt and close cooperation with NATO. But the undercurrent stimulated by President Trump’s apparent antagonism toward NATO, the European Union, and the European allies has begun to make this initiative feel like a declaration of defense independence from U.S. leadership, or at least as a hedge against American abandonment.

Americans should wish the members of the European Union the best of luck in improving their now-deficient defense efforts. But if it happens as a way of politically challenging the United States, we are likely to see a steady deterioration of transatlantic political-military cooperation.

Now, the irony is that this European effort is not likely to lead to the extreme outcomes advocated by some Europeans, including the creation of a “European army.” To get to the extreme point of the process — a true European defense union — the members of the European Union would first have to agree on very extensive integration of their political systems — a political union. In this international environment, we know that things previously unimaginable can become possible. However, it seems highly unlikely, in the near term, that E.U. member political leaders would give up autonomous control over such core national sovereignty decisions such as sending military forces to fight and die on behalf of their country or the European Union.

It also is doubtful that the members of the European Union would be able in that same time frame to shift resources sufficiently to support such an extensive plan. They already find the NATO goal of spending 2 percent of GDP on defense challenging. Why should one expect E.U. members to be able to spend what could be twice that to support a fully-fledged European defense union, to say nothing of a “European army?”

The far more desirable option, in terms of both European and American interests, is for all NATO allies to work together to develop plans and capabilities to deal with the very real security threats that face them. This process can and should include much more intensive European-level cooperation, if it is developed in an intensive cooperation between NATO and the European Union.

### Space Assets 2AC AT: EU CP Net Benefit

#### Strategic autonomy? More like strategic incompetence.

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[Published: 12-04-18. “The Delusion of Strategic Autonomy.” CEPA. Accessible: <https://www.cepa.org/the-delusion-of-strategic-autonomy>]  
Some Europeans want to take the initiative, stitching up deals with China and other trading partners (Latin America, Japan) who feel bruised by the mercantilist “America First” approach. They would like to make the euro into a reserve currency, ending the European dependence on the dollar-based international financial infrastructure. Europe may be puny when it comes to hard security, they argue, but it wields clout elsewhere: just imagine if it combined its capabilities on aid, diplomacy, finance, trade, and soft-power strategically.  
  
Such an approach would be interesting; it would certainly give the U.S. administration cause to rethink its approach to Europe, though possibly not in the way that Europeans would like.  
  
For now and the foreseeable future, though, the question is purely theoretical. The practical trend is towards greater impotence, not autonomy. Brexit is a distraction. The Franco-German axis, on which many hopes rested only a year ago, has splintered. Second-tier countries such as Italy (run by eccentric populists) and Spain (with a weak minority government), Sweden (with no government at all) and Poland (self-marginalized) are in no position to take their share of the burden. At the level of European institutions, nothing will happen until the dust settles from the European Parliament elections, perhaps by the end of next year.  
  
The result is introversion and impotence: an open door for Russian influence, and, increasingly, Chinese. That is frustrating for everyone, not least the United States, which for years has been urging Europe to do more. But instead of serious contributions to global security, what Europe offers is empty talk of autonomy, exemplified by the notion of a “European Army”—a militarily nonsensical idea which threatens to weaken NATO at a time when the Alliance needs to do more, not less.  
  
Against this bleak background it is easy to despair. But it is worth remembering that the West survived the Cold War in worse shape than it is now. The USSR was a serious strategic adversary which controlled half of Europe and projected power all over the world. Russia is a nuisance not a threat. It succeeds mainly through bluff, not muscle. Transatlantic disunity is nothing new either. Europe shunned the U.S.-led cold war in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. France stormed out of NATO’s command structure in 1966 and did not return until 2009.  
  
Woolly, self-indulgent talk of “autonomy,” strategic or otherwise, counts for little when migration, climate change, humanitarian catastrophes, and technological change all remind Europeans insistently of the competitive, dangerous, and interconnected outside world. Like it or not, these threats necessitate cohesion, decisiveness—and a strong transatlantic Alliance.

#### Alt causes to EU leadership.

Tony **Barber 19**, Europe editor at the Financial Times, 11-4-2019, "New EU leadership team must up its game on foreign policy," https://www.ft.com/content/e08b101e-fa48-11e9-a354-36acbbb0d9b6  
  
The new EU leadership team taking office in Brussels knows that, if the bloc’s common foreign policy is to command respect, the first place where it must achieve success is in Europe’s neighbourhood. It needs to be well-planned, as united as possible, efficiently executed and imbued with a larger sense of long-term strategy. In all these regards, two recent episodes — one concerning the Balkans, and the other Syria — have been little short of a debacle.

Each incident points to the EU’s inability to translate its undoubted weight as a commercial and regulatory bloc into hard power on the world stage. It is not just a matter of lack of military muscle, important though that is. The real problem is that, whenever two or more of the EU’s biggest countries are in disagreement, a common European foreign policy is either ~~paralysed~~ [stagnated] or becomes a question of finding the lowest common denominator among 28 states. An often overlooked point is that these disagreements tend to arise out of domestic political tensions in individual countries — over, for example, irregular migration or attitudes to Islam or Russia. Such tensions hobble the attempts of governments to find common ground with their EU partners.

In any case, France, Germany and other EU countries usually prefer to keep their freedom of manoeuvre when it suits them. The Syrian episode centres on Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, who is Angela Merkel’s preferred candidate to succeed her as German chancellor. Ms Kramp-Karrenbauer was named defence minister in July in an apparent attempt to raise her profile with German voters. But the proposal for a multinational security zone in northern Syria that she came up with this month was startling for its naivety and lack of preparation. Before unveiling her plan, Ms Kramp-Karrenbauer, who replaced Ms Merkel as the Christian Democratic party’s leader in December ahead of elections due in 2021, consulted neither her Social Democratic coalition partners nor Germany’s Nato and EU allies. Her proposal skipped over crucial questions such as whether the UN Security Council would endorse it, whether the US would take part and whether Germany’s under-resourced armed forces would send soldiers to Syria. To each question it rapidly became clear that the answer was almost certain to be no. Indeed, it was hard to tell who was more dismissive of the initiative — Russia and Turkey, which control events on the ground in Syria, or Heiko Maas, Germany’s foreign minister, who is of course a colleague of Ms Kramp-Karrenbauer. In this way, the plan served no purpose other than to illustrate the incoherence of the German coalition’s foreign policy, not to mention the EU’s near-irrelevance in Syria.

This is a sobering thought in view of the fact that the 2015 arrival of large numbers of war refugees from Syria and other conflict zones, plus other migrants, precipitated one of the EU’s worst crises since the 1957 Treaty of Rome that set up the bloc.

The EU’s mis-steps in the Balkans are no less painful to watch, but in this case the main culprit is France, not Germany. By blocking Albania and North Macedonia from opening EU membership talks, President Emmanuel Macron shocked and undermined a region whose stability is integral to the stability of the European continent. In North Macedonia’s case, Mr Macron’s move made the EU reek of hypocrisy. For the EU had long promised to start entry talks, provided that the Macedonians compromise with Greece over their country’s disputed name — a condition fulfilled in the Prespa agreement, which came into force last February.

In fairness to Mr Macron, he is not alone in having doubts about enlarging the EU into south-eastern Europe. Denmark and the Netherlands joined France in opposing Albania’s entry talks. Moreover, when the European parliament adopted a resolution last week in favour of starting accession talks with the two Balkan states, some 136 MEPs — or almost a quarter of those who voted — backed Mr Macron’s position. Furthermore, Mr Macron has a point when he suggests that the EU should focus on internal reforms before absorbing new members. The EU’s most important project, the 19-nation eurozone, remains a half-built house. Effective EU-wide action is woefully lacking in areas such as migration and asylum policy. However, Mr Macron would sound more persuasive, but for the persistent rumours that France’s true objective is to close the EU door forever to western Balkan countries. Instead they would be fobbed off with membership of the European Economic Area, which would keep them out of the EU’s political institutions and make them permanent second-class Europeans. The Syrian and Balkan embarrassments are symptoms of an EU unsure of its place in the world and suffering from ineffective Franco-German co-operation. But if the EU cannot get things right on its own doorstep, where can it?

#### No autonomy---unorganized C&C, capability gaps, and mistrust.

**Economist 19** --- International Weekly Newspaper.

[Published: 3-14-19. “What would happen if America left Europe to fend for itself?” The Economist. Accessible: <https://www.economist.com/special-report/2019/03/14/what-would-happen-if-america-left-europe-to-fend-for-itself>]

Yet the Europeans would immediately face institutional hurdles. Compared with Russia’s top-down system, command and control is hard enough in consensus-bound nato. It would be a bigger challenge for Europeans alone, especially if they did not inherit nato’s command structure. The eu may want to take the lead, but military thinking is not in its dna. Besides, an eu-only alliance would be a pale shadow of nato: after Brexit, non-eu countries will account for fully 80% of nato defence spending.

There would be gaps in capabilities, too. How bad these were would depend on the mission, and how many operations were under way at the same time. The European-led interventions in Libya and Mali exposed dependence on America in vital areas such as air-to-air refuelling and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. A detailed look at the sort of scenarios Europe might face would help to identify other gaps, and what it would take to fill them. Bastian Giegerich of the iiss, who is starting to work on such assessments, reckons that realistically the gap-filling could take 15 years or so. That is a long time for places like Poland and the Baltic countries that feel under threat. Fear and mistrust could quickly conspire to make narrow national interests trump efforts to maintain European unity. Hence a second, perhaps likelier, version of what might follow an American withdrawal: Europe Divided.

Jonathan Eyal of the Royal United Services Institute in London imagines a frenzy of activity, a cacophony of summits—and a renationalisation of defence strategies. Lots of countries would seek bilateral deals. In central Europe he would expect an alliance between Poland and Romania to guarantee the eastern border. The Russians and Chinese would not sit idly by, he says, but would play their own games with the Greeks, Hungarians and others.

It is these games of mistrust that the American security guarantee has largely helped to avoid. They could all too easily resurface. “Establishing a purely European defence”, warns Michael Rühle, a long-time nato official, “would overwhelm the Europeans politically, financially and militarily.”